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Logic Talk∗
Alexander W. Kocurek Forthcoming in Synthese
Abstract. Sentences about logic are often used to show that certain embedding ex-
pressions (attitude verbs, conditionals, etc.) are hyperintensional. Yet it is not clear
how to regiment “logic talk” in the object language so that it can be compositionally
embedded under such expressions. In this paper, I develop a formal system called
hyperlogic that is designed to do just that. I provide a hyperintensional semantics
for hyperlogic that doesn’t appeal to logically impossible worlds, as traditionally
understood, but instead uses a shiftable parameter that determines the interpre-
tation of the logical connectives. I argue this semantics compares favorably to the
more common impossible worlds semantics, which faces difficulties interpreting
propositionally quantified logic talk.
1 Introduction
Philosophers talk about logic all the time. They debatewhich logic is correct
(if any), which laws of logic hold, which inferences are valid, and so on. But
philosophical debates are not the only place where such talk occurs. We can
attribute beliefs about logic to people (“My colleague thinks intuitionistic
logic is correct”), counterfactually reasonabout alternative logics (“Teaching
logic would be way harder if the law of noncontradiction failed”), andmore
besides. Such “logic talk” seems continuous with the way we talk about
non-logical matters. Yet relatively little has been done to situate such talk
about logic within a broader semantic theory. My aim here is to make some
initial steps toward such a theory—that is, to develop a semantics for logic
talk.
By ‘logic talk’, I roughly mean any sentence that is, in some sense, about
logic, i.e., a metalogical claim. Here are some simple examples:
(1) Classical logic is correct.
(2) The law of excluded middle holds.
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(3) Some contradiction entails everything.
These are stereotypical examples of the kinds of claims philosophers debate.
But logic talk is not restricted just to these sorts of simple sentences. It
includes, e.g., sentences that describe what holds according to other logics.
(4) According to intuitionistic logic, the law of excluded middle fails.
(5) Nothing is valid in the strong Kleene logic.
(6) Everything that is intuitionistically valid is classically valid.
It also includes sentences that embedmetalogical claimsunder, e.g., attitude
verbs, conditionals, or modals.
(7) Inej believes intuitionistic logic is correct.
(8) If the Liar were true and not true, the law of noncontradiction would
fail.
(9) Classical logic might not be correct.
Embedded examples such as (7)–(9) pose two challenges for the theory
of logic talk. First, there is the familiar hyperintensionality problem. The
standard intensional semantic theories for attitude verbs, conditionals, and
modals predict that these expressions validate the replacement of necessary
equivalents. Yet this prediction seems incorrect, as illustrated by (10)–(12).
(10) Inej believes paraconsistent logic is correct.
(11) If the Liar were true and not true, the law of excluded middle would
fail.
(12) The trivial logic might be correct.
These do not seem equivalent to (7)–(9), even though (assuming classical
logic is correct) their constituents are necessarily false, and thus necessarily
equivalent. One challenge, then, is to explain what’s going on here.
But these examples raise a second,morebasic problem: it’s not even clear
how to regimentmetalogical claims in the first place. Normally, metalogical
claims are stated in themetalanguage—we talk of axiomatic proofs, models,
sequents, and so on. Examples like (7)–(9) require bringing such talk into
the object language: we need to assign compositional semantic values to
metalogical claims. But how? We cannot, for instance, regiment (8) as
‘p; ^ ¬ ;q ¬ ( ¬p) ^ ¬)q’: the string ‘( ¬p) ^ ¬)q’ is not a formula of
the object language but rather an abbreviation in the metalanguage. What
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we need is an object-level regimentation of ‘( ¬p) ^ ¬)q’ so that it can be
given a compositional semantic value.
My goal is to motivate and develop a formal system called hyperlogic
that can help address these problems. Hyperlogic solves the regimenta-
tion problem using three ingredients. First, it introduces a multigrade
operator ▷ representing entailment. So where 1 , . . . , = ,  are formulas,
p1 , . . . , = ▷ q is a formula which, intuitively, represents the claim that
1 , . . . , = entail . Second, laws of logic are formalized with proposi-
tional quantifiers (Fine, 1970). Thus, we can regiment the law of excluded
middle as @?p▷p? _ ¬ ?qq. Finally, claims about what laws hold accord-
ing to a logic are formalized using an “according-to” operator @ borrowed
from hybrid logic (Areces and ten Cate, 2006). So, we can regiment (4) as
@8; ¬@?p▷p? _ ¬ ?qqwhere 8; stands for intuitionistic logic.
To solves the hyperintensionality problem, theorists standardly invoke
“logically impossible worlds” as arbitrary sets of formulas. However, I ar-
gue that there are difficulties interpreting propositional quantifiers in an
impossible worlds semantics for embedding expressions like counterfac-
tuals. Instead, I build off Kocurek and Jerzak’s (2021) hyperintensional
semantics, which introduces a shiftable parameter that provides the inter-
pretation of the connectives (cf. Muskens 1991; Williamson 2009; Muñoz
2020). I will show how this theory can be expanded to a hyperintensional
semantics with propositional quantifiers that fits more naturally with hy-
perlogic. As we will see, this semantics retains the flexibility of logically
impossible worlds without the technical difficulties they bring.
Throughout, I will be working within a classical framework in the back-
ground. This is not because I think classical logic is the “one true” logic
or that hyperlogic must be developed within a classical setting to be intel-
ligible (cf. Meyer and Routley 1977).1 The task of developing an adequate
semantics for logic talk arises independently of which logic is actually cor-
rect (if any). My goal, rather, is to demonstrate one general strategy for
1Indeed, this project is in many ways connected to work in relevant logic (Dunn and
Restall, 2002; Mares, 2004, 2020). I view hyperlogic as a step towards developing what
Routley (2019) calls a “universal logic”: a logic that’s “applicable in every situation whether
realised or not, possible or not” (seeNolan 2018 for a critical overview of Routley’s program).
The approach taken here will be different from Routley’s in that I aim to develop a universal
logic within a classical framework, rather than revise the base logic. Other choices of
background logic may be equally (or even more) fruitful as starting points (cf. Weber 2014;
Girard and Weber 2015; Weber et al. 2016). It would be also worth investigating how
the hybrid aspects of hyperlogic change in nonclassical settings; see Braüner 2006, 2011;
Braüner and de Paiva 2006; Chadha et al. 2006 for work on intuitionistic hybrid logic, as well
as Standefer 2020 for work on relevant logics for ‘actually’.
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developing such a semantics. The choice of a classical background logic is
just a convenient starting point.
The plan is as follows. In §2, I examine the regimentation problem in
more detail and present some desiderata that any adequate solution to it
should satisfy. In §3, I propose the language of hyperlogic as a solution
to the regimentation problem. In §4, I introduce the impossible worlds
approach as a solution to the hyperintensionality problem and argue it
faces difficulties interpreting propositional quantifiers. In §5, I show how
to expand Kocurek and Jerzak’s (2021) hyperconvention semantics into a
semantics for hyperlogic that can more adequately interpret propositional
quantifiers. I conclude in §6 with some ways we might extend hyperlogic
to cover a broader range of phenomena.
2 The Regimentation Problem
Let’s start with the regimentation question: how dowe regimentmetalogical
claims so that they can be interpreted in the object language?
To illustrate the problem, consider again (7)–(9). To provide a semantics
for these sentences, we first need to regiment them in a formal language—
one with a belief operator , a counterfactual, or an epistemic modal◇4
respectively. We can partly regiment these claims as follows:
pIntuitionistic logic is correctq
p; ^ ¬ ;q ¬pThe law of noncontradiction holdsq
◇4 ¬Classical logic is correct
To assign these sentences truth conditions, however, we need to finish the
regimentation: we need to formalize the embedded sentences as some
formulas (e.g., 8;, ;=2, and 2; respectively), and then write down a semantic
clause for each. But how? What semantic clause do we give such formulas?
One way to avoid this problem is to formalize metalogical claims as
distinct atomics ?8; , ?;=2 , and ?2; . The formal interpretation of these atomics
is simply determined by a valuation function provided by a model. Then
(7)–(9) become:
 ?8;
p; ^ ¬ ;q ¬ ?;=2
◇4 ¬ ?2;
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This atomic regimentation works well enough for many purposes. But
it has twomain disadvantages. First, it ignores the internal logical structure
of metalogical claims. For example, metalogical claims can have quantifica-
tional structure, as illustrated by (3):
(3) Some contradiction entails everything.
The reasons why we can’t accurately regiment such quantificational struc-
ture with atomic formulas are familiar (e.g., they can’t distinguish de dicto
from de re sentences). Similarly, the atomic regimentation is blind to the
structure of according-to claims, as in (4):
(4) According to intuitionistic logic, the law of excluded middle fails.
This insensitivity to logical form is undesirable. It would be better if the
syntax of our formal language at least somewhat matched (even if not
perfectly) the actual syntactic structure of such talk.
Second, it does not capture differences in patterns of reasoning with
metalogical claims. For example, consider the following argument:
(13) a. According to intuitionistic logic, the law of excluded middle
fails.
b. Intuitionistic logic is correct.
c. Therefore, the law of excluded middle fails.
This seems like impeccable reasoning regardless of what one thinks about
the premises. By contrast, the following argument is bad:
(14) a. According to intuitionistic logic, the law of excluded middle
fails.
b. Quantum logic is correct.
c. Therefore, the law of excluded middle fails.
Yet the difference between (13) and (14) cannot be captured on the current
approach, as both arguments are represented as having the form:
?, @ 6 A
For another example, contrast (15), which seems like good reasoning, and
(16), which does not:
(15) a. Everything is entailed by every contradiction.
b. Therefore, everything is entailedby somecontradiction (or other).
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(16) a. Everything is entailed by some contradiction (or other).
b. Therefore, everything is entailed by every contradiction.
After all, given that there are contradictions, if all contradictions entail
everything, then some do. So (15) seems like good reasoning. But there are
logics on which everything is entailed by some contradiction or other (e.g.,
everything is entailed by the result of conjoining it with its negation) even
though contradictions don’t entail everything. So (16) does not seem like
good reasoning.
Let me be clear: I am not claiming that (14) and (16) are bad because
they’re invalid. On a standard (classical) notion of validity, these arguments
are all trivially valid since they have either an impossible premise or a
necessary conclusion.2 My point, rather, is that there is some good-making
feature that (13) and (15) have and that (14) and (16) lack. Very roughly,
(13) and (15) seem to be good forms of reasoning regardless of one’s views
about which logic is correct, whereas (14) and (16) do not. Even if we do
not call this feature “validity”, it demands explanation nonetheless.
3 The Language of Hyperlogic
I now develop a solution to the regimentation problem called hyperlogic.
The purpose of this section is simply to introduce the language of hyperlogic
and explain its intended interpretation. I’ll give a semantics in §5.
3.1 The Language
To introduce the language of hyperlogic, we start with the language of
propositional modal logic, which I’ll call ℒ. The language contains an
infinite stock of propositional variables Prop “ t?1 , ?2 , ?3 , . . .u, boolean
connectives (¬,^,_,Ñ), and modal operators (◻,◇).3 The syntax is given
2Of course, (14) and (16) may be invalid on a stricter notion of validity. For example,
these arguments could be deemed invalid in the sense of relevant logic (Anderson and
Belnap 1975; Dunn and Restall 2002; Mares 2004, 2020). Again, my assumption of a classical
background logic is just a starting point. Alternative choices of background logicmight lead
to different views on what exactly is wrong with these arguments (see Weber 2014; Girard
and Weber 2015; Weber et al. 2016 for semantical analyses within nonclassical metatheory).
My claim is just that these arguments seem bad in some sense that is not accounted for by
saying they’re invalid on a classical conception of validity.
3We could add other connectives to the language, including those that arise in nonclas-
sical logics such as “intensional” conjunction and disjunction operators from relevant logic
(Dunn and Restall, 2002) or exponentials from linear logic (Di Cosmo andMiller, 2019). But
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below in Backus-Naur form:
)F ? | ¬) | p) ^ #q | p) _ #q | p)Ñ #q | ◻) | ◇).
To get the language of hyperlogic, we make three additions to ℒ.
First, we add a left-multigrade operator▷ representing entailment. It is
“left-multigrade” in that it takes a finite (possibly empty) list of formulas on
the left and a formula on the right.4 Informally, we can read )1 , . . . , )=▷#
as “)1 , . . . , )= entail #”. Similarly, we can read ▷) as “) is valid”. The
notion of entailment that ▷ represents need not be solely logical per se.
In principle, it can be interpreted as analytic, a priori, metaphysical, or
whatever other notion of entailment one employs in characterizing validity
for arguments. Thus, we can represent the claim that my shirt being red
entails its being colored as A▷ 2. Like any other operator, the interpretation
of ▷ is something to be specified by a model.
Second, we’ll introduce propositional quantifiers (@?, D?) that bind into
sentence position.5 This allows us to represent quantificational structure
more faithfully. For example, here is how we can regiment (3):
D? @@pp? ^ ¬ ?q▷ @q.
Furthermore, we can now regiment laws of logic as universally quantified
sentences.6 Thus, the law of excludedmiddle can be regimented as follows:
@?p▷p? _ ¬ ?qq.
Third, we will introduce operators borrowed and modified from hybrid
logic. Hybrid logic is an extension of modal logic with terms denoting
individual worlds. These terms act both as special atomics that are true
at exactly one world and as arguments for certain operators.7 Specifically,
hybrid logic adds the following to propositional modal logic:
(i) two new kinds of atomic formulas, viz., state variables B1 , B2 , B3 , . . .
and state nominals =1 , =2 , =3 , . . . , which are true at exactly oneworld;
(ii) an operator@ (‘according to ,. . . ’) for each state term , which resets
the current world of evaluation to be the world denoted by 
I will stick with the standard “boolean” connectives for ease of exposition.
4We could make ▷ right-multigrade also to account for multiple-conclusion logics, but
we’ll set this complication aside.
5For more on propositional quantifiers, see Bull 1969; Fine 1969, 1970; Kaplan 1970;
Kaminski and Tiomkin 1996; Holliday 2017; Holliday and Litak 2018; Fritz 2020.
6See Williamson 2013; Bacon 2020 for related approaches.
7See Areces and ten Cate 2006; Braüner 2017 for an overview.
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(iii) an operator Ó B (‘where B stands for the current world,. . . ’) for each
state variable B, which resets the value of B to be the current world of
evaluation.
Hybrid logic is useful for, amongother things,modeling temporal language,
which often contains names for specific times, e.g., ‘It’s 3pm’ or ‘At 3pm, it’ll
rain’ (Yanovich, 2015). The idea here is to extend our language with hybrid
operators for interpretations of the base language, including the connectives
(¬, ^, etc.), rather than for individual worlds.8
Putting this all together, here is the full language of hyperlogic, which I’ll
callℋ . We introduce two new sets of atomic formulas: IVar “ t81 , 82 , 83 , . . .u
(interpretation variables) and INom “ t;1 , ;2 , ;3 , . . .u (interpretation nomi-
nals). An interpretation term is a member of ITerm B IVarY INom. We use
1 , 2 , 3 , . . . for interpretation terms. The syntax ofℋ is given as follows:
)F ? |  | ¬) | p) ^ #q | p) _ #q | p)Ñ #q | ◻) | ◇) |
p)1 , . . . , )= ▷ #q | @? ) | D? ) | @ ) | Ó 8.).
For instance, let 2; stand for classical logic and let 8; stand for intuitionistic
logic. Then we can regiment (1) and (4) as follows:9
(1) Classical logic is correct.
2;
(4) According to intuitionistic logic, the law of excluded middle fails.
@8; ¬@?p▷p? _ ¬ ?qq
8The idea to introduce hybrid operators of this sort comes from Kocurek and Jerzak
2021, though they introduce it for different reasons, viz., to distinguish between convention-
shifting readings of counterlogicals from non-shifty readings. I’ll discuss Kocurek and
Jerzak’s (2021) motivation in §5.1.
9One complication with this regimentation of (4): it’s not entirely clear how we should
regiment a law’s failure according to some logic. There are at least three ways a law λ can
“fail” for a logic ;. There’s an “external” notion: λ externally fails for ; if it’s not the case
that according to ;, λ holds (¬@; λ). There’s also an “internal” notion: λ internally fails for ;
if its negation holds according to ; (@; ¬ λ). Finally, there is a third, intermediate “classical”
notion: λ classically fails for ; if according to ;, λ does not hold, where the ‘not’ here is
interpreted as classical negation. This is the notion of failure we get by holding fixed what
we actuallymean by ‘fails’ or ‘does not hold’ (given our background logic is classical) within
the scope of according-to operators. Thus, we can regiment this notion using the Ó binder
(@; Ó 8.@2; ¬@8 λ). For concreteness, I have regimented (4) using the internal notion, but
nothing in what follows hinges on this choice.
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In sum, here is how we can regiment logic talk in hyperlogic:
• p; is correctq is regimented using ; as an interpretation nominal.
• paccording to ;, )q is regimented as @; ).
• p)1 , . . . , )= entail #q is regimented as p)1 , . . . , )= ▷ #q.
• pit is a law that )p@1 , . . . , @=qq is regimentedas@@1 ¨ ¨ ¨ @@=)p@1 , . . . , @=q.
3.2 Solving the Regimentation Problem
Recall, there are two issues with the atomic regimentation: it does not
faithfully represent the internal structure of metalogical claims, and it does
not capture the relative goodness of patterns of reasoning with such claims.
We are now in a position to see how hyperlogic addresses these concerns.
First, the language of hyperlogic clearly provides us with amore faithful
representation of the internal syntactic structure of logic talk. We’ve already
seen how propositional quantifiers allow us to represent quantificational
structure and how hybrid operators allow us to represent the common
structure in according-to sentences. This does not mean the language of
hyperlogic matches perfectly with the syntactic structure of logic talk. But
it does far better than the atomic regimentation.
Second, we can now explain the relative goodness of patterns of reason-
ing with logic talk. For example, consider (13) and (14) again:
(13) a. According to intuitionistic logic, the law of excluded middle
fails.
b. Intuitionistic logic is correct.
c. Therefore, the law of excluded middle fails.
@8; ¬@?p▷p? _ ¬ ?qq, 8; 6 ¬@?p▷p? _ ¬ ?qq
(14) a. According to intuitionistic logic, the law of excluded middle
fails.
b. Quantum logic is correct.
c. Therefore, the law of excluded middle fails.
@8; ¬@?p▷p? _ ¬ ?qq, @; 6 ¬@?p▷p? _ ¬ ?qq
Intuitively, the difference between (13) and (14) is that the former but not
the latter has the form of a good inference regardless of one’s views about
logic. Specifically, it has the following form, which seems to be impeccable
reasoning even if the premises are false:
@; ), ; 6 )
9
4 Impossible Worlds
Similarly, (15) has the logical form of a good inference regardless of one’s
views about logic, while (16) does not.
(15) a. Everything is entailed by every contradiction.
b. Therefore, everything is entailedby somecontradiction (or other).
@? @@pp@ ^ ¬ @q▷ ?q 6 @? D@pp@ ^ ¬ @q▷ ?q
(16) a. Everything is entailed by some contradiction (or other).
b. Therefore, everything is entailed by every contradiction.
@? D@pp@ ^ ¬ @q▷ ?q 6 @? @@pp@ ^ ¬ @q▷ ?q
Up to this point, I’ve refrained from spelling out what “regardless of
one’s views about logic” means. This will be made more precise later
(§5.4). To foreshadow, we can define two notions of validity in hyperlogic: a
classical notion and a “universal” notion. An argument is classically valid
if it’s truth-preserving on a classical interpretation of the connectives. An
argument is universally valid if it’s truth-preserving on any interpretation
of the connectives. The sense in which (13) and (15) are “good”, then, is
that both arguments are universally valid. By contrast, (14) and (16), though
classically valid (for trivial reasons), are not universally valid.
With hybrid operators, we can move back and forth between classical
validity and universal validity.
• )1 , . . . , )= 6 # is universally valid iff @; )1 , . . . ,@; )= 6 @; # is clas-
sically valid, where ; does not occur in )1 , . . . , )= ,#.
• )1 , . . . , )= 6 # is classically valid iff 2;, )1 , . . . , )= 6 # is universally
valid, where 2; is a classical nominal.
So there’s no need to settle which notion of validity is the “true” notion
(though there can still be fruitful debate over which is better for which
purpose). Both notions of validity can be seen as virtues of an argument.
4 Impossible Worlds
Thus far, we’ve only focused on the regimentation problem. Now let’s re-
turn to the hyperintensionality problem. While one could try to explain
away hyperintensionality by appeal to pragmatics, I will simply assume
that hyperintensionality is generally a semantic phenomenon. The chal-
lenge, then, is to develop a hyperintensional semantics for the relevant
10
4 Impossible Worlds
embedding expressions (e.g., attitude verbs, counterfactuals, etc.), i.e., a se-
mantics on which necessarily (even logically) equivalent sentences are not
intersubstitutable salva veritate.
The standard semantic approach to dealing with hyperintensionality is
what I’ll call the impossible worlds approach.10 This approach modifies
intensional semantic theories by introducing “impossible worlds” where
necessarily equivalent sentences can be distinguished.
In this section, I will consider whether the impossible worlds semantics
can provide us with a simple solution to the hyperintensionality problem.
I argue that the standard implementation of this semantics runs into prob-
lemswhenwe try to extend itwith languageswithpropositional quantifiers,
which we’ve seen are crucial to solving the regimentation problem.
4.1 Impossible Worlds Semantics
The impossibleworlds approach starts by expanding the notion of a “world”
so as to include both possible and impossible worlds. We can think of a
world as an ersatz entity—say, a set of formulas (Nolan, 1997). Truth-at-a-
world reduces to membership: ) is true at an ersatz world F iff ) P F. A
“possible” world is just a maximal compossible set of formulas, whereas an
“impossible” world is a set that is not both maximal and compossible. So to
transform an intensional semantics into a hyperintensional one, we simply
replace possible worlds with worlds in this broader sense.
To illustrate, let’s see how this approach applies to counterfactuals.11
According to the standard “selection” semantics, a counterfactual is true
iff at all the selected (“closest”) possible worlds where the antecedent is
true, the consequent is true. This is implemented formally by introducing a
selection function 5 , which takes a set of possible worlds - and a possible
world F, and “selects” a set of possible worlds 5 p-, Fq as the “closest”
or “most similar” --worlds to F (Stalnaker, 1968; Lewis, 1973). Thus, a
counterfactual ) # is true at a possible world F iff 5 pv)w , Fq Ď v#w
(where v)w “ tE | ) is true at E u).
10See Nolan 1997; Vander Laan 2004; Krakauer 2012; Brogaard and Salerno 2013; Jago
2014; Kment 2014; Berto et al. 2018; Berto and Jago 2019; French et al. 2020. There are other
approaches to hyperintensionality that I do not have space to consider here. See Fine 2012;
Schaffer 2016; Wilson 2018; Leitgeb 2019 for some prominent examples. For an overview of
different approaches to hyperintensionality, see Berto and Nolan 2021.
11My implementation of the impossible worlds approach to counterfactuals is largely in
line with that of French et al. 2020. See also Mares 1997; Nolan 1997; Brogaard and Salerno
2013; Kment 2014; Berto et al. 2018 for other examples. This semantics is closely related to
the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevant logics; see Mares 2004 for an overview.
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Applied to this semantics, the impossible worlds approach allows selec-
tion functions to select sets containing impossible worlds. More precisely,
we start with an extension of ℒ with counterfactuals:
)F ? | ¬) | p) ^ #q | p) _ #q | p)Ñ #q | ◻) | ◇) | p) #q.
An impossible worlds model is a quadruple ℐ “ x,, %, 5 , +y, where ,
is a nonempty set of worlds, % Ď , is a nonempty set of possible worlds,
5 : ℘, ˆ , Ñ ℘, is a selection function (perhaps satisfying certain
constraints, e.g., 5 p-, Fq Ď -), and + is a valuation function where:
(i) +p?, Fq P t0, 1u for each F P % and each ? P Prop
(ii) +p), Fq P t0, 1u for each F P % and each ).12
Satisfaction (,) is definedas follows. IfF P %, thenℐ , F , ) iff+p), Fq “ 1.
If F P %, then , is defined recursively:
ℐ , F , ? ô +p?, Fq “ 1
ℐ , F , ¬) ô ℐ , F . )
ℐ , F , ) ^ # ô ℐ , F , ) and ℐ , F , #
ℐ , F , ) _ # ô ℐ , F , ) or ℐ , F , #
ℐ , F , )Ñ # ô ℐ , F , ) only if ℐ , F , #
ℐ , F , ◻) ô for all E P %: ℐ , E , )
ℐ , F , ◇) ô for some E P %: ℐ , E , )
ℐ , F , ) # ô 5 pv)wℐ , Fq Ď v#wℐ .
Consequence is defined as preservation of truth over possible worlds:
Γ ( ) if for all ℐ “ x,, %, 5 , +y and all F P %, if ℐ , F , Γ, then ℐ , F , ).
Since possible worlds are all classical, this notion of consequence is an
extension of classical S5. But counterfactuals are hyperintensional: even if
) and # are logically equivalent (i.e., true at all the same possible worlds in
every model), there can still be impossible worlds in some models where )
and # differ in truth value.
Note, there are no recursive clauses for how the truth of a complex
formula at an impossible world is related to the truth of its constituents.
This is because, in order to model logic talk, some impossible worlds need
12Following Tanaka (2018), this clause could be generalized so that formulas can take
multiple (or no) truth values at an impossible world. This additional complication does not
affect the main arguments below, however, so I will set this aside.
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to be logically impossible.13 And when it comes to the logically impossible,
anything goes: there are impossible worlds where ^ and _ are equivalent,
where ¬ is a redundant operator, or even where everything is true. Such
worlds are strange, to be sure, but nothing rules them out—in fact, such
worlds are needed to fully model logic talk. So there simply is no single
set of recursively defined truth conditions that applies to every logical
impossibility. This means truth at impossible worlds must be determined
by fiat via the valuation function. As we’ll now see, this feature of the
impossible worlds semantics causes it difficulties.
4.2 Quantifier Problems
To provide a full semantics for metalogical claims, the impossible worlds
semantics needs to be capable of being extended to a language that’s capable
of solving the regimentationproblem, such as hyperlogic. Iwill nowpresent
a challenge to doing this. Specifically, I argue that the impossible worlds
semantics, as stated, faces difficulties adequately interpreting propositional
quantifiers.
The standard semantics for propositional quantifiers (S5`) interprets
them as quantifiers ranging over sets of worlds (Fine, 1970). So where
ℳ “ x,,+y is a possible worlds model and where - Ď , , let +?
-
be like
+ except that +?
-





y. Then here is
the semantics for propositional quantifiers in S5`:
ℳ , F , @? ) ô for all - Ď, : ℳ?
-
, F , )
ℳ , F , D? ) ô for some - Ď, : ℳ?
-
, F , ).
In words, @? ) is true iff ) is true on every interpretation of ?, where
“an interpretation of ?” is just an assignment of ? to some possible-worlds
proposition (i.e., a set of possible worlds).
Importing this into the impossible worlds semantics, we get something
like the following. Where ℐ “ x,, %, 5 , +y, let +?
-




p?, Fq “ 1 iff F P -, and let ℐ?
-




ℐ , F , @? ) ô for all - Ď, : ℐ?
-
, F , )
13As Tanaka (2018) and Sandgren and Tanaka (2020) note, there are two senses in which
a world can be logically impossible: it can be logically different, in that the laws of logic
differ from the actual laws, or it can contain a violation of a logical law (cf. Kocurek and
Jerzak 2021, pp. 22–23 on actual vs. counterfactual logical impossibility). Here, by “logically
impossible”, I mean to neutrally refer to either notion of logical impossibility. The semantics
provided in §5 can represent either kind of logical impossibility.
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ℐ , F , D? ) ô for some - Ď, : ℐ?
-
, F , ).
Thus, propositional quantifiers have essentially the same meaning as in
S5`, except now ? can denote a more fine-grained proposition, viz., a set
of worlds that may include some impossible worlds, too.14
The problem with this proposal is that +?
-
only changes the truth of ?
at impossible worlds, not the truth of complex formulas involving ?. To see
why this is an issue, consider the following inference (where @ ‰ ?):
D?pp? ^ ¬ ?q @q 6 @?pp? ^ ¬ ?q @q.
Intuitively, this is invalid: just because one contradiction (e.g., @ ^ ¬ @)
counterfactually implies @, it does not follow that all contradictions do (at
least, not if we want counterfactuals to be hyperintensional). Yet, according
to the semantics for propositional quantifiers above, it is valid precisely
because changing the interpretation of ? does not change the interpretation
of ? ^ ¬ ?, i.e., +?
-
p? ^ ¬ ?, Fq “ +p? ^ ¬ ?, Fq.15
This problem suggests we need to define +?
-
so that it differs from +
not just on the interpretation ? but also on the interpretation of complex
formulas involving ?. The trouble is that it is not clear how to do this.
Again, when it comes to the logically impossible, anything goes. How do
we know whether some arbitrary impossible world is supposed to be one
that allows contradictions? And even if it does, how do we know which
interpretations of ? generate contradictions? Without further guidance, we
simply have no way of knowing how we are allowed to interpret ? ^ ¬ ? at
an impossible world given an arbitrary interpretation of ?.
We might try to solve this problem by simply quantifying over all the
ways of interpreting complex formulas from interpretations of their con-
stituents. More precisely, let + 1 „? + iff + 1 is like + except for how it
14Nolan (1997, p. 563) argues that not every set of impossible worlds counts as a proposi-
tion. Thus, we may want to include in our models a domain of sets of worlds the quantifiers
can range over. (So the semantics would be closer to S5.) This won’t affect the substantive
points in what follows, however.
15Proof: suppose ℐ , F , D?pp? ^ ¬ ?q @q where ℐ “ x,, %, 5 , +y and F P %. Let
- Ď , . Since possible worlds are classically consistent, v? ^ ¬ ?wℐ Ď %. But since +?
-
doesn’t reassign the truth of ? ^ ¬ ?, +?
-
p? ^ ¬ ?, Eq “ +p? ^ ¬ ?, Eq for E P %. Hence,
v? ^ ¬ ?wℐ
?
- “ v? ^ ¬ ?wℐ , and so 5 pv? ^ ¬ ?wℐ
?
- , Fq “ 5 pv? ^ ¬ ?wℐ , Fq. Moreover, since
@ ‰ ?, +?
-
p@, Fq “ +p@, Fq, and so v@wℐ
?
- “ v@wℐ . Therefore, if 5 pv? ^ ¬ ?wℐ
?
- , Fq Ď
v@wℐ
?
- for any - Ď , , then it holds for all -. In other words, D?pp? ^ ¬ ?q @q entails
@?pp? ^ ¬ ?q @q.
14
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interprets formulas with ?. Then the proposal is:
ℐ , F , @? ) ô for all + 1 „? + : ℐ1 , F , )
ℐ , F , D? ) ô for some + 1 „? + : ℐ1 , F , ).
Unfortunately, this won’t work either. Consider the following argument
(where ? doesn’t occur free in )):
¬◇) 6 D?p) p? ^ ¬ ?qq.
Clearly, this argument is not valid: there is no contradiction that would be
true if intuitionistic logic were correct. But on these truth conditions for the
quantifiers, it is valid: assuming ) is impossible, our witness can be a + 1
like + in every way except + 1p? ^ ¬ ?, Dq “ 1 iff D P 5 pv)w , Fq.
The problem is that some impossible worlds are meant to be governed
by specific nonclassical logics. Intuitively, we only want to quantify over
propositions that conform to the logic of a world. On the current truth
conditions, though, there are no constraints on which interpretations of
complex formulas we can quantify over. So we can quantify over interpre-
tations of formulas that violate those logics at those worlds.
To solve this problem, we need to equip worlds with something like a
semantics for the connectives, i.e., a set of rules that tell us how to interpret
complex formulas given an interpretation of their constituents. That way,
when we reinterpret the atomics, the semantics will automatically give
guidance for how that changes the interpretation of complex formulas. As
we’ll see, that is exactly what the hyperconvention semantics provides.
5 The Hyperconvention Semantics
I now present an alternative semantics, the hyperconvention semantics, for
hyperlogic. This semantics is based on Kocurek and Jerzak’s (2021) “log-
ical expressivist” semantics for counterlogicals, which relativizes truth to
a shiftable parameter (a “hyperconvention”) that provides the interpreta-
tion of the logical connectives (cf. Muskens 1991; Williamson 2009; Muñoz
2020). I build off this semantics to develop a semantics for hyperlogic. In
§5.5, I’ll show how this semantics avoids the problems plaguing the impos-
sible worlds semantics from §4.2.
5.1 Hyperconventions
Kocurek and Jerzak are primarily concerned with counterlogicals, i.e.,
counterfactuals with logically impossible antecedents. They argue that
15
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counterlogicals can only be semantically nonvacuous if we are allowed to
shift the interpretation of the logical connectives. This because, they argue,
if we hold fixed what words like ‘not’ and ‘or’ actually mean when evaluat-
ing (17), then we would expect (for the usual Kripkean reasons) that (17) is
trivially true, whereas it clearly seems false.
(17) If intuitionistic logicwere the correct logic, then either the continuum
hypothesis would be true or it would not be true.
To capture this thought, they introduce the notion of a hyperconvention
(inspired by Gibbard’s (2003) notion of a hyperplan). Hyperconventions
provide an interpretation of the modal language ℒ, including the logical
connectives. They model the interpretation of a connective as an operation
on sets of worlds—intuitively, an ordinary possible worlds proposition. For
instance, a hyperconvention 2 will map ¬ to a function 2p¬q from proposi-
tions to propositions. They then relativize truth to a world and a hypercon-
vention. So ¬) is true at F according to 2 iff F P 2p¬qp-q where - is the
proposition expressed by ) according to 2.
Kocurek and Jerzak motivate this semantics by situating it in a more
general philosophy of logic (what they call “logical expressivism”) onwhich
purely logical claims are expressions of commitments to logics. Expressions
of logical commitments aremeant to contrast with factual claims about “the
one true logic” or descriptive claims about how speakers actually use logical
vocabulary. Rather, their picture is that speakers have a range of factual
beliefs as well as commitments to using language in a certain fashion. Such
commitments are not automatically determined by the speaker’s factual
beliefs, but can be informed by them (like an intention or a plan).16
In what follows, I want to build off this idea to develop a semantics for
hyperlogic. To be clear, we do not need to endorse Kocurek and Jerzak’s
logical expressivism to do this. We can, if we wish, interpret the hyper-
convention parameter as a purely factual one (e.g., determined by the way
speakers at aworld use logical vocabulary). In employing the hyperconven-
tion semantics, we need not take a stand on these controversial issues. The
crucial idea, for our purposes, is to separate out the semantic contributions
of the interpretation of the connectives from the world parameter so that
the two can be shifted independently.
16This view can be seen as a species of logical pluralism (Beall and Restall, 2006), though
the latter is a broader category. Kocurek and Jerzak (2021, p. 17) argue that logics are
effectively semantic conventions governing logical vocabulary. According to logical expres-
sivism, adopting a logic is akin to adopting a language: just as there is no such thing as “the
one true” semantic convention, so too, there is no such thing as “the one true” logic.
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Let’s define the notion of a hyperconvention more formally.17
Definition 1 (Hyperconvention). Let  be a new symbol not in the
signature ofℋ . A hyperconvention over a set, is a function 2 with
domain t ,¬,◻,◇,^,_,Ñ,▷u Y Prop such that:
(i) 2pq Ď ℘, (the proposition space of 2, written as 2)
(ii) 2p?q P 2 for all ? P Prop
(iii) 2p‚q : 2 Ñ 2 where ‚ P t¬,◻,◇u
(iv) 2p˝q : 22 Ñ 2 where ˝ P t^,_,Ñu
(v) 2p▷q : ă$2 ˆ 2 Ñ 2 .
For readability, wemaywrite☆2 (with infix notation) instead of 2p☆q.
Letℍ, be the set of all hyperconventions over, .
A convention over, is a nonempty set of hyperconventions over
, . Let ℂ, “ ℘`ℍ, be the set of conventions over, .
Notice I have not placed any constraints on the possible interpretations
of ▷. We don’t require ▷ obey any sort of structural rule (commutativity,
contraction, etc.). We don’t even require ▷ to be factive (so that ▷2- Ď
-) or noncontingent (so that -1 , . . . , -= ▷2 . is always either , or H).18
This is mainly for the sake neutrality, as I do not want to take a stand on
what entailment relations count as “genuine” logics. Ultimately, we will
let the models determine which interpretations of ▷, or any of the other
connectives, are to be considered.
Most logics can be represented by a convention, i.e., a set of hypercon-
ventions. In fact, it can be shown that any (finitary, single-conclusion) logic
overℒ can be represented by a convention assuming, is infinite (§A). One
can often represent the most commonly discussed logics using a possible
worlds semantics for that logic.
To illustrate, let’s consider a convention representing an intuitionistic
propositional logic (I’ll ignore modal operators for now). Let K “ xW ,ďy
be an intuitionistic Kripke frame. Let K be the set of hyperconventions 2
satisfying the constraints below:
2 “ t- Ď, | @F, E P, : F P - & F ď E ñ E P - u
17Since Kocurek and Jerzak’s (2021) semantics does not include propositional quantifiers
or an entailment operator, we need to generalize their notion of a hyperconvention.
18One reason to allow▷ to be noncontingent is to model logics such asK3 on which there
are no logical validities. It would be natural to capture this fact about K3 with the formula
@? ¬@:3p▷ ?q. But if entailment facts are necessary, then this formula will be falsifiable.
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¬2 - “ tF P - | @E ě F : E R - u
- ^2 . “ - X .
- _2 . “ - Y .
-Ñ2 . “ tF P, | @E ě F : E P - ñ E P . u
-1 , . . . , -= ▷2 . “ tF P, | -1 X ¨ ¨ ¨ X -= Ď . u .
Then K represents the logic of K : any propositional ) is intuitionis-
tically valid over K iff p▷2 v)w2q “ , for each 2 P K (where v)w2 “
tE | ) is true at E according to 2 u; see Definition 5 in §5.3).
It is essential to this example that 2 is not the full powerset. Otherwise,
? ▷ ¬¬ ? would be falsifiable in K—that is, 2p?q Ę ¬2 ¬2 2p?q for some
2 P K—and so K would not represent intuitionistic logic.19 It is crucial
to the intuitionistic Kripke semantics that truth is persistent under ď: if F
satisfies ) and F ď E, then E satisfies ). The “counterexamples” to double
negation introduction involve sets that are not upward closed under ď.
Most nonclassical logics come equipped with a view about what counts as
a proposition. In order to represent a logic, onemust ensure the proposition
space captures the relevant notion of a proposition for that logic.
5.2 Three Notions of Proposition
Again, the key idea behind the hyperconvention semantics is to evaluate
truth relative to a world and a hyperconvention. That way, according-
to operators can shift the interpretation of the connectives by shifting the
hyperconvention parameter of points of evaluation or “indices”. Thus,
indices need to be defined as world-hyperconvention pairs.
Definition 2 (Index). Given a set of hyperconventions  over , ,
an index over  is a pair xF, 2y where F P , and 2 P . Let
 “ , ˆ  be the set of indices over . Where  Ď  , let
p2q B tF P, | xF, 2y P u.
19Proof: let F P, be such that there is a F1 ą F in, . Let 2p?q “ tFu. Then:
¬2 ¬2 tFu “ tE P, | @D ě E : D R ¬2 tFuu
“ tE P, | @D ě E DI ě D : I P tFuu
“ tE P, | @D ě E : F ě D u .
But F R ¬2 ¬2 tFu, since F1 ě F but F ğ F1. Thus, tFu Ę ¬2 ¬2 tFu.
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Since truth is evaluated relative to worlds and hyperconventions, there
are several notions of a “proposition” in this semantics, each of which play
an important role. First, there is a coarse-grained notion of a proposition as
a set ofworlds. World propositions act as the interpretation of propositional
variables relative to a hyperconvention; operations over world propositions
act as the interpretation of the connectives relative to a hyperconvention.
Second, there is a more fine-grained notion of a proposition as a set of
indices. Indexpropositions act as the refined compositional semantic values
of formulas assigned by our model.
There is also a third, intermediate notion of a proposition worth dis-
cussing: sets of indices  where, relative to any hyperconvention 2, the set
of worlds p2q is in the proposition space of 2.
Definition 3 (Visible Proposition). Given a set of hyperconventions
 over, , avisiblepropositionover is a set of indices Ď , such
thatp2q P 2 for all 2 P ℍ, . Letℙ be the set of visible propositions
over . I’ll use -,., . . . for world propositions, , , . . . for index
propositions, and %, &, . . . for visible propositions.
Observe that if  is nonempty, then ℙ is nonempty, since the proposition
space of any hyperconvention is nonempty. In particular, 2p?q is always a
member of 2 by clause (ii) of Definition 1. Thus, the index proposition %? ,
where %?p2q “ 2p?q for all 2, is visible.
Visible index propositions are the kind of proposition that the proposi-
tional quantifiers range over. We do not want quantifiers to range over all
index propositions. For if they did, it would be too easy to refute a law of
logic according to a nonclassical logic.
To illustrate, recall the example from §5.1 of the convention K repre-
senting intuitionistic logic. We saw that if the proposition space of every
2 P K were unrestricted, we could find counterexamples to double nega-
tion introduction (? ▷ ¬¬ ?), which is intuitionistically valid. Similarly,
if the domain of propositional quantification were to include every index
proposition, we could find counterexamples to the quantified version of
double negation introduction (@?p? ▷ ¬¬ ?q).20 By contrast, if we restrict
the domain of propositional quantification to visible propositions, no such
counterexample can be constructed.
20Proof: just pick an index proposition whose restriction to some 2 P K is tFu.
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5.3 Semantics
We are now ready to present the semantics more explicitly. The models of
our semantics must specify (i) a set of states (or “worlds”), (ii) a domain of
admissible conventions, (iii) a domain of admissible (visible) propositions,
and (iv) a valuation function.21
Definition 4 (Hypermodel). A hypermodel is a tuple of the form
ℳ “ x,, ℂ , ℙ , +y, where:
• , ‰ H is a state space
• ℂ Ď ℂ, is a convention domain; we also define ℍ “
Ť
ℂ
to be the hyperconvention domain
• ℙ Ď ℙℍ is a proposition domain such that:
(i) for all ? P Prop, %? P ℙ, where %?p2q “ 2p?q
(ii) for all 2 P ℍ and - P 2 , there is a % P ℙ where
%p2q “ -
• + is a valuation such that:
(i) +p?q P ℙ
(ii) +p;q P ℂ
(iii) +p8q P ℂ Y tt2u | 2 P ℍu
Where G is a variable and  is a possible value for that variable, we
write+G for the valuation like+ except that+G pGq “ . We likewise
write ℳG for x,, ℂ , ℙ , +G y.
I have imposed two very weak requirements on the domain of propo-
sitional quantification, largely for technical convenience. First, the index
proposition that picks out the interpretation of ? at each hyperconvention
must be included in the domain. This ensures that hyperconventions that
assign different world propositions to the atomics are not indiscernible.22
Second, each world proposition in a hyperconvention’s proposition space
must be picked out by some index proposition in the domain. This rules out
“propositional impossibilia”, i.e., world propositions that from the model’s
21While Kocurek and Jerzak (2021) model logics (which are the referents of interpretation
terms) as hyperconventions, this proposal is too stringent for our purposes, as it would
require logics to provide interpretations of every propositional variable. To avoid this
concern, we can let the interpretation terms denote conventions, i.e., sets of hyperconventions
(cf. Kocurek and Jerzak 2021, fn. 21).
22Note, however, that +p?q need not be %? ; this is essential, since quantifiers need to be
capable of reinterpreting atomics.
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perspective do not exist.
Finally, here is the semantics:
Definition 5 (Semantics). Where ☆ P t¬,^,_,Ñ,◻,◇,▷u:
ℳ , F, 2 , ? ô F P +p?qp2q
ℳ , F, 2 ,  ô 2 P +pq
ℳ , F, 2 , ☆p)1 , . . . , )=q ô F P 2p☆qpv)1wℳ ,2 , . . . , v)=wℳ ,2q
ℳ , F, 2 , @? ) ô for all % P ℙ: ℳ?% , F, 2 , )
ℳ , F, 2 , D? ) ô for some % P ℙ: ℳ?% , F, 2 , )
ℳ , F, 2 , @ ) ô for all 21 P +pq: ℳ , F, 21 , )
ℳ , F, 2 , Ó 8.) ô ℳ 8
t2u
, F, 2 , ),
where v)wℳ ,2 “ tE P, |ℳ , E, 2 , ) u.
Here is an informal statement of the semantic clauses. Propositional
variables denote visible index propositions; so ? is true at xF, 2y iff F is a
member of the world proposition assigned to ? at 2. Interpretation terms
denote conventions, i.e., sets of hyperconventions; so  is true at xF, 2y iff 2
is a member of the convention denoted by , i.e.,  denotes a “correct” con-
vention from 2’s perspective. Connectives denote intensional operations;
so (e.g.) ¬) is true at xF, 2y iff (i) v)w2 denotes a world proposition that
exists according to 2, and (ii) the operation 2 assigns to ¬, when applied
to v)w2 , yields a world proposition that is true at F. Quantifiers range
over interpretations of the propositional variables; so (e.g.) @? ) is true at
xF, 2y iff ) is true at xF, 2y on any interpretation of ? within the proposition
domain. According-to operators quantify over the hyperconventions in a
convention; so @ ) is true at xF, 2y iff ) is true at F on any maximally
specific convention compatible with the convention denoted by . Finally,
the binder is a device for keeping track of individual hyperconventions; so
Ó 8.) is true at xF, 2y iff ) is true at xF, 2ywhen we reassign 8 to denote t2u.
Let me note one feature of the semantics that some may find ques-
tionable: iterated according-to operators are redundant in that @ @ ) is
semantically equivalent to @ ). Thus, all logics agree on what holds ac-
cording to all other logics. Just speaking for myself, I do not have clear
intuitions about whether this is correct. In general, it is unclear how to
interpret a sentence like (18).
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(18) According to intuitionistic logic, the law of excluded middle holds
according to classical logic.
In one sense, (18) seems false: intuitionistic logic doesn’t say anything about
what laws hold according to classical logic. But in another sense, (18) seems
true: according to intuitionistic logic, classical logic is incorrect precisely
because the law of excluded middle holds according to it. In other words,
if intuitionistic logic “says nothing” about what holds according to classical
logic, then it “says nothing” about whether classical logic is correct.
I suspect there are simply two ways to hear (18). For simplicity, I’ve
chosen to set this issue aside and treat iterated according-to operators as
redundant. This is in line with how these operators standardly work in
hybrid logic and it simplifies the formalism greatly. But I acknowledge
one may want to generalize hyperlogic to allow for nonredundant iteration
of according-to operators. There are ways of generalizing the framework
to accomplish this, but I want to set this complication aside. I view this
redundancy as an idealizing assumption that requires further investigation,
rather than the final say on the logic of according-to operators.
5.4 Consequence
In the hyperconvention semantics, there are two notions of consequence
we can define. There is a classical notion of consequence, i.e., truth-
preservation relative to a classical interpretation of the connectives. There
is also a universal notion of consequence, i.e., consequence no matter how
we interpret the connectives.
To make this precise, I need to explain what a “classical” convention is.
Throughout, I will use 2; as a designated classical interpretation nominal.
Definition 6 (ClassicalHyperconvention). Ahyperconvention 2 over
, is classical if for all -,. P 2 :
¬2 - “ - - ^2 . “ - X .
◻2 - “ tF P, | - “, u - _2 . “ - Y .
◇2 - “ tF P, | - ‰ Hu -Ñ2 . “ - Y .,
and for all -1 , . . . , -= , . P 2 :
p-1 , . . . , -= ▷2 .q B tF P, | -1 X ¨ ¨ ¨ X -= Ď . u .
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A convention is classical if all of its member are classical. A hyper-
modelℳ is classical if +p2;q is classical.
If 2 is classical, then the truth conditions for the connectives reduce
to their classical ones and, moreover, ▷ reduces to necessary implication:
p-1 , . . . , -= ▷2 .q “ ◻2pp-1 ^2 ¨ ¨ ¨ ^2 -=q Ñ2 .q.
Definition 7 (Consequence). Where Γ Ď ℋ and ) P ℋ :
• Γ classically entails ), written Γ ( ), if for any classical hy-
permodelℳ “ x,, ℂ , ℙ , +y, any F P, , and any 2 P +p2;q:
ℳ , F, 2 , Γ ñ ℳ , F, 2 , ).
• Γ universally entails ), written Γ )), if for any classical
hypermodelℳ “ x,, ℂ , ℙ , +y, anyF P, , and any 2 P ℍ:
ℳ , F, 2 , Γ ñ ℳ , F, 2 , ).
Note universal entailment is still restricted to classical hypermodels, even
though it requires truth-preservation over any hyperconvention. This re-
striction is largely a matter of formal convenience, as it allows us to rigidly
refer back to classical logic (or rather, a classical interpretation of the connec-
tives) using 2;. Universal entailment, however, still requires truth preserva-
tion over any hyperconvention, even nonclassical ones.
In §3, I noted that classical validity and universal validity can be defined
in terms of one another. I now make this observation precise.
Theorem 8 (Embedding Validity). Let Γ Ď ℋ and ) P ℋ . Where ;
is an interpretation nominal, let @; Γ “ t@;  |  P Γu.
(a) Assume ; ‰ 2; does not occur anywhere in Γ or in ). Then
Γ
)) iff @; Γ ( @; ).
(b) Γ ( ) iff 2;, Γ )).
Proof : Theonly interestingdirection is the right-to-left directionof (a).
Suppose @; Γ ( @; ) and ℳ , F, 2 , Γ. Let ℳ ;2 “ x,, ℂ , ℙ , + ;2 y,
where + ;2 is exactly like + except that + ;2 p;q “ t2u. By a simple
induction on formulas, if " does not contain ;, then ℳ , F, 2 , "
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iff ℳ ;2 , F, 2 , ". Hence, ℳ ;2 , F, 2 , Γ, and so ℳ ;2 , F, 21 , @; Γ for
each 21 P + ;2 p2;q. By supposition, ℳ ;2 , F, 21 , @; ), in which case
ℳ ;2 , F, 2 , ). Therefore,ℳ , F, 2 , ). ∎
In §3, I said we could explain the relative goodness of patterns of rea-
soning with logic talk by appealing to a notion of consequence where the
premises entail the conclusion “regardless of one’s views about logic”. Uni-
versal consequence can capture this notion of relative goodness. For in-
stance, @ ) and  universally entail ), which explains why inferences like
(13) seem good. Thus, the logic of hyperlogic has the requisite features
needed to fully resolve the regimentation problem.
5.5 Counterfactuals
Now let’s look at how the hyperconvention semantics would handle coun-
terfactuals. One simple way to do this is to combine the hyperconvention
semantics in §5.3 with Kocurek and Jerzak’s (2021) logical expressivist se-
mantics for counterfactuals. On this approach, counterfactuals are allowed
to shift hyperconventions, so that the antecedent and consequent may be
evaluated relative to other logics.23 Like with the standard selection se-
mantics, we may assume that which hyperconventions the counterfactual
may shift to will depend on the context (specifically, on which indices count
as “closer” or “more similar” to the starting index in that context). Thus,
even if two sentences are necessarily equivalent according to our actual
conventions, the counterfactual may require taking us to a convention that
distinguishes between those sentences.24
We can flesh this out formally as follows. Again, just for illustration, I
will adopt a selection semantics for counterfactuals.
Definition 9 (Selection Hypermodel). A selection hypermodel is
a tuple ℳ “ x,, ℂ , ℙ , 5 , +y, where x,, ℂ , ℙ , +y is a hyper-
23Kocurek, Jerzak, and Rachel Rudolph argue elsewhere, following the work of Einheuser
(2006), that even conditionals not about logic can shift the convention used to interpret
material in their scope (Kocurek et al., 2020).
24Note, this does not mean that counterfactuals are “metalinguistic” in the sense of be-
ing about language or conventions. Rather, the semantics models hyperintensionality by
allowing counterfactuals to shift the conventions used to interpret material in their scope.
Compare: quantifiers shift variable assignments, but that doesn’t mean they’re “about”
variable assignments.
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model in the sense of Definition 4 and 5 : ℘ ℍ ˆ ℍ Ñ ℘ ℍ is a
selection function.
Definition 10 (SelectionSemantics). Satisfaction isdefinedas inDef-
inition 5 with the following additional clause:
ℳ , F, 2 , ) # ô 5 pv)wℳ , F, 2q Ď v#wℳ
where v)wℳ “ txE, 3y P ℍ |ℳ , E, 3 , ) u.
Simply put: ) # is true at xF, 2y iff # is true at all the closest indices
to xF, 2y where ) is true. Again, we could place constraints on 5 (e.g.,
5 p, F, 2q Ď ) as desired.
Kocurek and Jerzak (2021) prove that their logical expressivist seman-
tics generates the same logic as that of the impossible worlds semantics:
Γ entails ) in the impossible worlds semantics iff Γ classically entails ) in
the logical expressivist semantics semantics. Since the hyperconvention se-
mantics is an extension of the logical expressivist semantics, the same holds
for the hyperconvention semantics over the quantifier-free and hybrid-free
fragment (i.e., over the language ℒ extended with). Thus, (classical)
consequence in the two semantic theories coincide. In particular, both do
equally well at solving the hyperintensionality problem, at least over this
restricted language.
But there are twomajor differences between the semantic theories. First,
in the hyperconvention semantics, truth is determined in a uniform, com-
positional manner: the semantic value of a complex formula is always a
function of the semantic value of its parts. It’s just that the “semantic
value” of a formula is a set of world-hyperconvention pairs, rather than a
set of worlds. By contrast, the semantic value of a formula in the impossible
worlds semantics is a set of possible and impossible worlds. In general,
two formulas with the same semantic value relative to a model may make
different contributions to the semantic value of complex formulas. Thus,
even if v?wℐ “ v@wℐ , it does not follow that v¬ ?wℐ “ v¬ @wℐ . This is not
necessarily a decisive objection to the impossible worlds semantics, but it is
a theoretical cost.
Second, when we expand the language to include propositional quan-
tifiers, the hyperconvention semantics seems to fare much better than the
impossible worlds semantics. Earlier in §4, we saw that the impossible
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worlds semantics faced problems interpreting propositional quantifiers in
part because impossible worlds do not contain a set of rules for determining
truth. This led to the awkward result that either D?pp? ^ ¬ ?q @q entails
@?pp? ^ ¬ ?q @q, or that ¬◇) entails D?p) p? ^ ¬ ?qq.
The hyperconvention semantics overcomes this problem. Hyperconven-
tions are essentially rules for interpreting complex formulas from their con-
stituents. So quantifiers range not only over interpretations of ? but also in-
terpretations of complex formulas involving ?. As a result, D?pp?^¬ ?q@q
does not (classically or universally) entail @?pp?^¬ ?q@q. But since quan-
tifiers are restricted to visible propositions, they cannot quantify over every
way of interpreting a formula. This is a restriction we saw was indepen-
dently motivated even before we considered counterfactuals. As a result,
¬◇) does not (classically or universally) entail that D?p) p? ^ ¬ ?qq.
Thus, the hyperconvention semantics enjoys a distinctive advantage over
the impossible worlds approach.
With that said, the hyperconvention semantics does not entirely jettison
the notion of an impossible world. In a way, world-hyperconvention pairs
can be seen as a different model of what an impossible world is. On the
standard picture, impossible worlds are ersatz entities, e.g., sets of formu-
las. In the hyperconvention semantics, impossible worlds are more like
worlds “under an alternative description” (i.e., paired with an alternative
hyperconvention). The latter determines the former—indeed, every set of
ℒ-formulas is the truth set of someworld-hyperconvention pair. But unlike
the impossible worlds semantics, the hyperconvention semantics achieves
this without appealings to separate truth conditions for possible and im-
possible cases. This allows us to capture the flexibility of impossible worlds
as arbitrary sets of formulas while avoiding the challenges facing the im-
possible worlds semantics in §4.2.
6 Conclusion
We started with two challenges for developing a semantics for logic talk.
First, there’s a regimentation problem: how do we regiment logic talk
in the object language so as to be compositionally embeddable? To this
question, I proposed hyperlogic as a solution. I argued that it was more
satisfactory as a language for regimenting logic talk than the brute-force
atomic regimentation.
Second, there’s a hyperintensionality problem: how do we interpret
logic talk so that embedding expressions can discern classically equivalent
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sentences? To this question, I proposed the hyperconvention semantics as
a solution. We saw that this semantics avoids the problems plaguing the
more common impossible worlds semantics. Yet it does so in a way that
still preserves the flexibility of impossible worlds.
In closing, I mention two ways in which hyperlogic can be fruitfully
generalized that would be worth further investigation in future research.
First, there’s the question of how to extend hyperlogic with attitude verbs,
such as a belief operator . A natural proposal would be to add an accessi-
bility relation ' between indices to hypermodels and then interpret  as
follows:25
ℳ , F, 2 ,  ) ô for all xE, 3y P 'pF, 2q: ℳ , E, 3 , ).
This could be useful for addressing the problem of logical omniscience
for agents who are perfect reasoners but endorse a nonclassical logic. For
instance, while p▷)q Ñ  ) is not valid, p  ^ @p▷)qq Ñ  ) is valid
(assuming ▷ is factive and noncontingent).26 In other words, if an agent
accepts a (reasonable) logic, their beliefs are closed under that logic, though
beliefs need not be closed under classical consequence generally.
However, this prediction may seem unwelcome if we want to model
agents who are uncertain or mistaken about what holds according to a
specific logic. As it stands, interpretation terms are rigid in the hyper-
convention semantics, meaning their denotation does not shift. Thus,
@p)1 , . . . , )= ▷#q entails @p)1 , . . . , )= ▷#q, i.e., agents are always om-
niscient about what follows from what according to each logic. Similarly,
@p)1 , . . . , )= ▷ #q entails  @p)1 , . . . , )= ▷ #q for any , i.e., claims
about what follows from what according to a specific logic are counterfac-
tually trivial.
To avoid this prediction,wewouldneed to allow interpretationnominals
to be nonrigid, so that belief operators (and counterfactuals) can shift their
interpretation. That way, even if an agent nominally accepts a logic, they
may be uncertain or mistaken about what follows according to that logic.
Such a revision could also be employed to generalize the semantics so that
iterated according-to operators are not redundant.
Second, given that counterfactuals can shift the interpretation of ¬, ^,
and so on, it would be natural to wonder whether counterfactuals can
25Wecould remove relativization to 2 and say' relatesworlds to indices. Either approach
would be fine for our purposes.
26If an agent accepts a logic that is not factive (so a validity might be false) or is contingent
(so a validity need not be necessarily valid), we should not expect their beliefs to be closed
under that logic anyway.
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shift the interpretation of counterfactuals as well. Even if we accept that
) ) is valid, we may want to consider logics where it is not, and even
counterfactually entertain its failure (‘If ) ) weren’t valid,. . . ’).
Furthermore, though hyperconventions constrain the domain of propo-
sitional quantifiers, the basic meaning of the quantifiers is held fixed across
hyperconventions. But different logics often provide different semantics for
the propositional quantifiers, too. Thus, one may want hyperconventions
to control the interpretation of propositional quantifiers.
As it stands, we cannot simply have hyperconventions interpret coun-
terfactuals and quantifiers as with the other connectives. The problem is
that the meanings of these expressions depend not just on the hypercon-
vention of evaluation but other hyperconventions as well. Thus, on pain of
set-theoretic circularity, we could not have 2pq : ℙℍ ˆ ℙℍ Ñ ℙℍ since
2 itself occurs in ℍ, and so appears in ℙℍ .
One strategy for dealing with this is to introduce a set of “markers”,
which act as pointers to operations on sets of indices. Then hyperconven-
tions can map to one of these markers, thereby indirectly specifying
how to interpret. (A similar strategy can apply to propositional quan-
tifiers.) More precisely, a hypermodel will now be a tuple of the form
ℳ “ x,, ℂ , ℙ , ", , +y, where " is some nonempty set of “markers”
and  maps each < P " to an binary operation on sets of indices, i.e.,
p<q : ℘ ℍ ˆ ℘ ℍ Ñ ℘ ℍ . We revise the definition of hyperconven-
tions so that 2pq P ", and revise the clause for counterfactuals:
ℳ , F, 2 , ) # ô xF, 2y P p2pqqpv)wℳ , v#wℳq.
Ahyperconvention in this sense is classical if p2pqq is a selection function
in the sense of Definition 9. Thus, in shifting the hyperconvention, we may
also shift the interpretation of the counterfactual.
A Representability Theorem
In this appendix, I establish that any finitary single-conclusion logic can be
represented in the hyperconvention semantics. In fact, we can represent
any logic using just a single hyperconvention. In addition, I show that this
improves upon the semantics in Kocurek and Jerzak 2021, which can only
represent a smaller set of logics.
First, we need to clarify what we mean by ‘logic’ and ‘represent’.
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Definition 11 (Logic). A logic over ℒ is a set L Ď ℒă$ ˆ ℒ of
pairs of the form xx)1 , . . . , )=y ,#y. (We allow the lefthand side to
be the empty tuple xy.) We may write )1 , . . . , )= ñL # in place
of xx)1 , . . . , )=y ,#y P L. We use ®) as shorthand for x)1 , . . . , )=y,
where the length is implicit (possibly zero).
Definition 12 (Representability). A logic L is representable inℳ “
x,, ℂ , ℙ , +y if there’s a 2 P ℍ, such that for all )1 , . . . , )= ,# P ℒ:
)1 , . . . , )= ñL # ô @F P, : ℳ , F, 2 , p)1 , . . . , )= ▷ #q.
Theorem 13 (Representation). Every logic is representable in an in-
finite hypermodel (i.e., |, | “ ℵ0).
Proof : Let 5 : ℒ Ñ , be an injection. Let r)s “ , ´ t 5 p)qu. Define
2 as follows.




r)s ˝2 r#s “ r) ˝ #s
, ˝2 r)s “ r)s ˝2 , “, ˝2 , “,
r)1s, . . . , r)=s▷2 r#s “
#
, if )1 , . . . , )= ñL #
r?1s otherwise.
®- ▷2 , “,
®-,,, ®. ▷2 / “ ®-, ®. ▷2 /.
Letℳ be a hypermodel over, with 2 in its hyperconvention domain
such that +p?qp2q “ r?s (e.g., we can let +p?q “ %?). By a simple
induction, v)wℳ ,2 “ r)s for all ) P ℒ.
Thus, if )1 , . . . , )= ñL #, then pr)1s, . . . , r)=s ▷2 r#sq “ , , so
ℳ , F, 2 , p)1 , . . . , )= ▷ #q. Conversely, if )1 , . . . , )= œL #, then
pr)1s, . . . , r)=s▷2 r#sq “ r?1s, so ℳ , 5 p?1q, 2 . p)1 , . . . , )= ▷ #q. ∎
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Theorem 13 contrasts with the situation for the semantics developed
in Kocurek and Jerzak 2021. There, they do not introduce an entailment
operator▷ into the language, so there is no obvious way to represent logics
in the usual sense. In a footnote, they suggest the following (rephrased
in our notation): 2 represents L in ℳ iff )1 , . . . , )= ñL # iff for all F,
if ℳ , F, 2 , t)1 , . . . , )=u, then ℳ , F, 2 , #. I will now show that on
this understanding of representability, a strictly smaller class of logics are
representable by a hyperconvention.
Definition 14 (Properties of Logics). A logic L is intensional if it
satisfies the following properties:
• reflexive: )ñL )
• transitive: if ®#ñL " and ®)ñL #8 for each #8 , then ®)ñL "
• commutative: if ®), ®#ñL ", then ®#, ®)ñL "
• monotonic: if ®)ñL #, then ®), "ñL #
• congruential: it obeys replacement of logical equivalents:
– for ‚ P t¬,◻,◇u: if )ôL )1, then ‚)ôL ‚)1
– for ˝ P t^,_,Ñu: if )ôL )1 and #ôL #1, then ) ˝#ôL
)1 ˝ #1.
Observe that reflexivity, commutativity, and monotonicity entail (in
fact, given transitivity, are equivalent to) the following property:
• reiterative: ®)ñL )8 for each )8 .
Definition 15 (IntensionalRepresentability). AlogicL is intension-
ally representable in ℳ “ x,, ℂ , ℙ , +y if there’s a 2 P ℍ, such
that for all )1 , . . . , )= ,# P ℒ:
)1 , . . . , )= ñL # ô v)1w
ℳ ,2
X ¨ ¨ ¨ X v)=w
ℳ ,2
Ď v#wℳ ,2 .
Theorem 16 (Intensional Representation). A logic L is intension-
ally representable in an infinite hypermodel ℳ iff L is intensional.
Regardless of ℳ’s size, L is intensionally representable in ℳ iff L
is intensional and the number of nonequivalent finite sequences of
formulas is no greater than |, |.
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Proof : The left-to-rightdirection is straightforward: one simply checks
that necessary implication has all the features of an intensional logic.
For the right-to-left direction, we begin by defining the finite
theory space of L, which is a generalization of the Lindenbaum-
Tarski algebra. Where x)1 , . . . , )=y P ℒă$, define:
rx)1 , . . . , )=ysL “ t# P ℒ | )1 , . . . , )= ñL # u .
The finite theory space of L is the order L “ xL ,ďLywhere:
• L “ trx)1 , . . . , )=ysL | x)1 , . . . , )=y P ℒă$ u
• r ®)sL ďL r ®#sL iff ®)ñL #8 for each #8 P ®#.
From now on, we’ll leave the L-subscripts implicit. Recall that a
meet-semilattice is a partial order where the meet (i.e., greatest lower
bound) of any two elements exists.
Claim:  is a meet-semilattice with a top element.
Proof : Since L is reiterative, )1 , . . . , )=ñL )8 for 1 ď 8 ď =. So
ď is reflexive. The transitivity and antisymmetry of ď follow
from the transitivity ofL. The top element is simply rxys. As for
the existence of meets, define the meet [ operation as follows:
r ®)s [ r ®#s “ r ®), ®#s.
That r ®), ®#s ď r ®)s and r ®), ®#s ď r ®#s follows from reiterativity.
Moreover, if r®"s ď r ®)s and r®"s ď r ®#s, then r®"s ď r ®), ®#s by
definition of ď. So [ really is a meet operation. ∎
It is a well-known fact of order-theory that any partial order can
be order-embedded into its powerset algebra in a meet-preserving
manner. Since L is at most the size of , , that means there’s an
injective map 5 :  Ñ ℘, such that:
(i) r ®)s ď r ®#s iff 5 pr ®)sq Ď 5 pr ®#sq
(ii) 5 pr ®), ®#sq “ 5 pr ®)sq X 5 pr ®#sq.
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What’s more, we can take 5 prxysq “, . For if 5 prxysq ‰, , define 5 ˚
to be exactly like 5 except 5 ˚prxysq “, . It is easy to then verify that
5 ˚ is still an order-embedding that preserves finite meets.
Define 2 as follows (where ‚ P t¬,◻,◇u and ˝ P t^,_,Ñu):
2 “ t 5 pr)sq | ) P ℒ u
2p?q “ 5 pr?sq
‚2 5 pr)sq “ 5 pr‚)sq
p 5 pr)sq ˝2 5 pr#sqq “ 5 pr) ˝ #sq.
This is well-defined. For if 5 pr)sq “ 5 pr#sq, then r)s “ r#s by
injectivity. Thus, )ôL #. So by congruentiality, ‚)ôL ‚#, which
means r‚)s “ r‚#s. Hence, 5 pr‚)sq “ 5 pr‚#sq. (And similarly for
binary connectives.)
Throughout, letℳ be a hypermodel of the relevant size with 2 in
its hyperconvention domain where +p?qp2q “ 2p?q. By induction:
Claim: For any ) P ℒ, v)wℳ ,2 “ 5 pr)sq.
Finally, we show that 2 intensionally represents L in ℳ.
ð Suppose )1 , . . . , )= œL #. Thus, r)1 , . . . , )=s ę r#s. Since
5 is order-reflecting, 5 pr)1 , . . . , )=sq Ę 5 pr#sq. So there is a
F P 5 pr)1 , . . . , )=sq ´ 5 pr#sq. Now observe:
5 pr)1 , . . . , )=sq “ 5 pr)1sq X ¨ ¨ ¨ X 5 pr)=sq
“ v)1w
ℳ ,2
X ¨ ¨ ¨ X v)=w
ℳ ,2 .
Hence,ℳ , F, 2 , )1 , . . . , )= but ℳ , F, 2 . #.
ñ Suppose )1 , . . . , )= ñL #. Then r)1 , . . . , )=s ď r#s. Since 5 is
order-embedding:
5 pr)1 , . . . , )=sq “ 5 pr)1sq X ¨ ¨ ¨ X 5 pr)=sq Ď 5 pr#sq, i.e.,
v)1w
ℳ ,2
X ¨ ¨ ¨ X v)=w
ℳ ,2
Ď v#wℳ ,2 .
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